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1 Introduction.
Consider the following situation: an enterprise has decided to sign a collaborative
contract to develop a certain R&D project with a finite horizon. There is a number
of potential partners in the market. Which are the ones allowing for a successful
completion of the project? Among those, which one should be chosen?
Also, after the (successful) completion of the project, the enterprise may envis-
age the possibility to extend the collaborative R&D activity. Should it do so with
the same partner, or should it start the procedure to select a partner anew, instead?
This paper attempts to answer these questions. We argue that the time horizon
and the initial technological endowments are crucial elements in the choice of the
collaborative partner even in a perfect information set-up. In other words, we sus-
tain that the failure of a project may well be due to the choice of a wrong partner
rather than to the lack of quality of the project. In this respect we complete theo-
retically the empirical arguments discussed in Lokshin et al. (2011) that identify
to which extent bad performing partnership outcomes entails a failure of the part-
nership agreements (often around 30% of signed agreements with R&D purposes).
Assuming that the conditions guaranteeing the existence of an optimal contract are
fulfilled if the contract is signed, the choice of the right partner is fundamental and
we are focusing on this issue.
The relevance of these questions arises in the framework of the recent growth
in the tendency of firms to engage in partnership agreements in R&D as a means
to increase their competitiveness (an extensive discussion can be found in Gillier
et al., 2011). The economic literature devotes quite a lot of attention to this phe-
nomenon from the empirical viewpoint. However, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no theoretical contribution that studies how firms select partners with which
to sign successful pre-competitive agreements. In this paper, we intend to focus on
it by looking at the importance of a firm’s initial technological endowments, for
instance, when deciding to sign a particular kind of collaborative R&D agreement.
During the period 1991-2001, international technology alliances increased from
339 to 602. U.S. firms were always the most involved in this process, participating
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in about 75% of all contracts (UNCTAD, 2005). A common evidence of these col-
laborative activities is that short contracts are preferred to long contracts. Several
arguments have been offered to support this observation. It may be that one party
needs to gather information on the other party, particularly regarding its trustwor-
thiness and willingness to cooperate in the future (Aghion et al. 2002). Harrigan
(1986) stresses that firms engage in different types of R&D partnerships to exploit
knowledge in new applications and to enter into new fields. Indeed, these ventures
allow firms to share research costs, save on assets, and avoid duplicative laborato-
ries and testing periods (see Hagedoorn, 2002, Roijakkers and Hagerdoorn, 2006
(focusing on the pharmaceutical sector) and Frankort et al. 2012). These col-
laborative agreements cover technology and the sharing of R&D between two or
more companies in combination with joint development projects. As an illustra-
tion, Segrestin (2005) explores the Renault-Nissan alliance as a new way to develop
high-risk innovative business opportunities involving the design of a new collec-
tive identity. This (successful) alliance had to cope with coordination and cohesion
issues in the form of a new managerial organization, and the appropriateness of ex-
isting legal frameworks to a new entity. All along the process, both manufacturers
could refrain from collaboration if the threat of opportunism outweighed profit ex-
pectations. As a second illustration, Iveco-Fiat has a record of research programs
containing high technological content with European and non-European partners.
One interesting feature of those contracts is that their length changes according to
the partners and nature of the agreement and that some programs can be renewed
(see the case of the programs Chauffeur I and Chauffeur II1). A few studies have
already suggested interesting arguments to justify the profitability of collabora-
tive agreements in case of technological similarities among the participating firms
(e.g., Chesbrough, 2003, Segrestin, 2005, or Zeller, 2004), but all the other situa-
tions are still unexplored. In contrast, our contribution will assess that a successful
agreement may also arise between firms with both similar and differentiated tech-
nologies.
1See http://cordis.europa.eu/telematics/tap transport/research/projects/chauffeur.html.
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Our research question is to examine whether firms’ initial technological en-
dowments are relevant for the successful completion of an agreement in a dynamic
framework with learning. The length of an agreement turns out to be a crucial
element in the cumulation of advantages stemming from the collaboration, along
with the selection of the suitable partners. It is the influence of an implicit process
of cumulation of experience that eventually allows for the selection of initial tech-
nologies that lead to successful collaborations. We address this issue by studying
a model of competition of partners in separated markets under long and short part-
nership agreements and extend the conclusions to the case of interrelated markets.
The main contribution of this paper is the modeling of the evolution in time of a
firm agreement to study how initial technological conditions determine its success
in a dynamic framework.
Formally, we set-up a two-stage model where two (horizontally) differentiated
firms compete in prices in the final product market in the second stage, while in the
first stage they decide on signing a technological agreement. With this two-stage
structure we capture the idea that firms when considering signing the agreement
foresee its consequences on the competition in the final product market. In other
words, we assume that firms have more flexibility in adjusting prices than in sign-
ing technology agreements. More precisely, the price competition stage is modeled
following Sing and Vives (1984) approach (see section 2). To induce the possibility
of collaboration in the first stage, we assume that firms bear different technologies
yielding different levels of technological efficiency. This difference in efficiency
generates the opportunity for signing an agreement entailing the development of
a joint technology whose outcome is the cut of the production costs in the second
stage. Therefore, our focus is to study a dynamic model of price competition whose
driving force is the temporal dimension embedded in the development of the joint
technology that follows a diffusion process to take into account the learning stem-
ming from the joint action of the two partners. Section 2.1 contains the detailed
description of the elements characterizing the content of the agreement: a diffusion
process that combines the initial technological endowments of the firms and makes
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their available technology evolve across time.
The dynamic mechanism proposed, besides its technical features, gives ratio-
nale to the empirically contrasted feature of the increasing difficulty of engaging
in long-term R&D partnerships. Using data from several countries, Canepa and
Stoneman (2004) identify that the principal determinants of diffusion patterns in
manufacturing technologies (whose size is quite relevant) are those generally clas-
sified as epidemic and ranks effects (as also discussed in Karshenas and Stoneman,
1993). We focus on agreements where both parties benefit from the advantages of
their collaboration in the research stage while maintaining their own identity and
independence, either in the commercialization phase of the final product or in the
adoption of a new productive process. We also assume that a successful agreement
will allow firms to produce more efficiently without closing the initial technolog-
ical gap between them. These assumptions although extreme try to maintain the
analysis clean of other arguments (such as the interest of technologically lagged
parties to catch up through collaborative contracts) already in the literature and
allow us to point to our novel argument to understand the importance of initial
endowments on the success of entrepreneurial partnerships.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main building blocks
of the theoretical setting. Section 3 deals with the definitions of the terms of the
agreement, and Section 4 presents the initial conditions suitable to ensure success-
ful agreements. Section 5 discusses the implications of such results and Section 6
presents our conclusions.
2 The model
In our theoretical development, we proceed by following a backward approach.
We start illustrating the (second-stage) price competition equilibrium between two
firms holding different technologies and, then, we will focus on the agreement issue
(first-stage). Following Vives (1999) and Singh and Vives (1984), we consider a
differentiated duopoly with two firms i = 1, 2 competing a` la Bertrand in the final
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product market. Market demands are linear and given by
qi = ai − bipi + cpj , i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j; ai > bi. (1)
Firms use constant but different marginal cost technologies given by,
Ci(qi) = ξiqi, i = 1, 2, (2)
where ξi ∈ (0, 1] is an exogenous parameter representing firm i’s capacity to con-
trol (and reduce) production costs.2 For simplicity, we normalize ξ1 = 1 and
assume ξ2 = ξ ≤ 1. If firms use the same technology then ξ = 1, while the more
efficient firm 2 is with respect to firm 1, the lower is ξ.
We introduce the technology transfer process below. Its particular features will
redefine the cost functions in accordance with the horizon of the agreement (see
section 3).
Let, pˆi denote firm i’s price net of its marginal cost. Solving for the profit
maximizing problem, we obtain prices,
pˆ∗1 =
2b2aˆ1 + caˆ2
4b1b2 − c2 ; pˆ
∗
2 =
2b1aˆ2 + caˆ1
4b1b2 − c2 , (3)
where aˆ1 := a1 − b1 + cξ, and aˆ2 := a2 − b2ξ + c. Also, we assume 4b1b2 > c2,
so that the economic logic requiring positive prices and quantities is satisfied.
In the case of independent goods (i.e. c = 0), markets are separated, and we
obtain monopoly prices:
pˆm1 =
a1 − b1
2b1
; pˆm2 =
a2 − b2ξ
2b2
. (4)
Note that these prices given our assumptions, are strictly positive. From the
equilibrium prices (3), we compute the associated equilibrium quantities,
q∗1 = b1pˆ
∗
1; q
∗
2 = b2pˆ
∗
2. (5)
Finally, equilibrium profits are given by,
Π1 = b1
(
2b2aˆ1 + caˆ2
4b1b2 − c2
)2
; Π2 = b2
(
2b1aˆ2 + caˆ1
4b1b2 − c2
)2
. (6)
2Note that we assume ξi > 0. This is so because ξi = 0 would mean that firm i has already
exhausted its possibilities to lower costs, thus pre-emptying its participation in any agreement.
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For future reference, monopoly profits are,
Πm1 =
1
b1
(
a1 − b1
2
)2
; Πm2 =
1
b2
(
a2 − b2ξ
2
)2
. (7)
2.1 The terms of the agreement
In the first stage of the partnership process, firms decide to sign an agreement to-
wards improving their efficiency in production. Such an agreement is characterized
by five elements:3 (i) the agreement lasts for a fixed number of periods; (ii) the two
parties agree not to use the outcome of their collaboration prior to its completion,
so that neither party obtains a competitive advantage in the final goods market;
(iii) the benefits stemming from the agreement do not allow the technologically-
lagged firm to level up with its partner; (iv) firms compare profits period by period
to determine the optimal length of the agreement; and (v) once the agreement is
completed, firms implement the reduction of production costs (as also studied in
Chipman, 1970).
We simplify the content of the contract by ignoring the penalties incurred when
partners fail to honor the contract.4 Instead, we impose its enforcement.
Features (ii), (iii) and (iv) provide the incentives for collaboration. In particular,
(ii) simply states that a contract implies commitment. Feature (iii) avoids the possi-
bility of only the less technologically-developed party being willing to collaborate.
Although it may be somewhat restrictive when partners belong to the same market,
it eases collaboration that would otherwise be unfeasible. Alternatively, when part-
ners belong to different markets, the assumption is innocuous. Finally, feature (iv)
places us in the worst possible scenario for collaboration. Allowing for the possi-
bility of profit transfers across periods only eases the possibilities of collaboration.
In this sense, our results have to be understood as limit results. Nevertheless, one
of our results states that the negative relationship between the probability of find-
3As it appears, for instance, in the Operating procedures of the HDP Inc at
http://www.hdpug.org/sites/all/files/Documents/HDP Op Procedures approved 1006.pdf.
4As we will argue in the next section, in that case our results would be even more stringent
because of the structure of our approach.
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ing partners and the time span of the agreement is robust to inter-temporal profit
transfer.
We model the content of the agreement as a technology diffusion process be-
tween the two firms. Jayaraman et al. (2004) state that a distinguishing feature
of a general technology transfer process is that the rate of diffusion in a particular
location at time t is proportional to the present level of diffusion and the level of
diffusion to be achieved.5 Similarly, the rate of assimilation of a technology (in an
industry) turns out to be proportional to the existing level of technology and that to
be achieved. To study the evolution of a general technological assimilation process,
the authors select the logistic function as the most suitable functional form. As the
aim of a pre-competitive agreement is to improve the partners’ technologies, we
follow Jayaraman et al. (2004) and also adopt the logistic function. This choice
allows us to interpret the dynamics of an agreement as the effort put by the firms
(across time) in accomplishing the objective of the contract.6 One firm plays the
role of transferor and the other firm plays the role of transferee, while keeping the
common objective to reduce cost in mind.
In doing so, we also recover a very common feature in literature of the devel-
opment and spreading of a new technology. We follow some well-known models
in industrial organization literature, such as Mansfield (1961) or De Palma et al.
(1991). The rationale of this choice is the following: the adoption of a new tech-
nology as well as its development moves along a path at a constant rate. There are
differences in adoption time simply because potential adopters are heterogeneous
and react differently to the new technology (Baptista, 1999). As stated in Mansfield
(1961), a logistic process is the most suitable process to model such a development
because it bears the difference in speeding the adoption of a new technology along
the development path. This process requires that the returns from the agreement
are higher at the beginning of the collaboration (because of the novelty effect), then
slowing down before finally reaching a constant motion. The most benefits are re-
5This finds empirical and theoretical support in the studies by Mansfield (1961), Stoneman (1981)
Karshenas and Stoneman (1993), or De Palma (1991).
6We are implicitly assuming the absence of any kind of free-riding behavior, as anticipated at the
beginning of this section.
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alized at the moment when the two firms sign the agreement, while the returns
reduce proportionally as time passes. In our framework, this is not a crucial point:
firms agree just for a particular project running for a short-period, while the crit-
icism addressed above deserves the most attention when considering an adoption
process in the long run. Here firms join their efforts to develop a unique technique
and the project follows its own path separated from the other activities of both part-
ners, even if each firm can only enjoy the benefits of the partnership at the end the
entire production.
Our model is set in discrete time, so we need to specify the logistic sequence
mapping of the diffusion process that Jayaraman et al. (2004) defined in continuous
time. Once the two partners begin collaborating in the common project, they ac-
quire new knowledge, causing their initial common stock of knowledge to evolve.
Therefore, we model this evolution as a diffusion process in discrete time. We
model the dynamics of the technological implementation process as follows: firms
agree in achieving a certain objective a at time t by means of a dynamic diffusion
process λt.
Let us denote by λ0 the stock of knowledge that both partners share at the
beginning of the agreement.
Assumption 1. Let λ0 be the initial value of λt. We define it as:
λ0 = ξ
α
1 ξ
β
2 ∈ (0, 1], with ξi ∈ (0, 1], α, β ∈ (0, 1) for i = 1, 2.
The value λ0 represents a composition of the initial levels of technology of the
firms. We assume that once a firm subscribes an agreement, it discloses its tech-
nological information (embedded in its production function) to the partner. Param-
eters α and β stand for the relative weight that each firm has in the agreement.
Accordingly, we assume α+ β = 1. Modeling the combination of the technology
as a Cobb-Douglas function allows for a full capture of the efforts between the two
partners by accounting for individual participation by each firm (to the realization
of the project) and the externalities that can emerge by the joint action. Addition-
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ally, note that from the definition of ξ, lower levels of λ means higher efficiency to
reduce production costs.
Definition 1. Let us consider a pre-competitive agreement between two firms last-
ing for t periods. The diffusion process embedded in λt is modeled as:
F t(λ0) = λt = µλt−1(a− λt−1), for t = 0, 1, ..., n, µ > 0, λ0 > 0. (8)
The process just described (see May, 1976 and Li and Yorke, 1975) is a quad-
ratic and concave function in λt, that for particular values of µwill lead to a chaotic
behavior. In the next section, we will precisely define its domain of existence and
will define its structure.
Equation (8) states that λt increases from one period to the next when it is
small, and decreases when it is large. The parameter µ is a multiplier of this dy-
namics and a represents the horizontal asymptote, ideally the limiting value of the
combination of the two technological endowments. This affects the steepness of
the hump in the curve. It captures a cumulation process that appears when the
agreement lasts for several periods. In terms of our model, this process can be in-
terpreted as follows. By construction, λ0 ∈ (0, 1] and equation (8) is built around
λ0. Hence, there is a continuum of possible agreements that spans from cases in
which firms participating in an agreement display different technologies (λ0 small)
to cases in which firms are similar in technology (λ0 large). The expected benefits
of the two extreme types of agreement are different. The maximum is reached at a
point where technologies are not identical but still match in an optimal way. This
occurs because the law of motion of λt given by (8) is quadratic and concave in λt.
Taking for granted that the optimal contracts supporting such agreements exist
(see Pe´rez-Castrillo and Sandonı´s, 1996 and Veugelers and Kesteloot, 1994), our
concern is to find the initial technological conditions that allow two firms to sign
an agreement that leads to an optimal and successful outcome.
We split our analysis into two parts. First, we study agreements that do not span
over time. We characterize the constellation of firms’ profiles allowing to mutually
benefit from an agreement. Next, we introduce the time dimension. The degree of
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differentiation of products supplied by firms may range from independent goods
(so that firms serve separate markets) to some degree of substitutability, so that
markets will be interrelated. We will consider in detail the former case and provide
somer insights on the latter.
Finally, a remark. Note that we assume that the bargaining powers α and β
are constant over time (in Assumption 1). Alternatively, it could be envisaged a
more general formulation with α(t) and β(t). There are two arguments advising
against pursuing this line of analysis. In economic terms, if the relative weights of
the firms in the negotiation vary with time, firms would be able to renegotiate the
terms of the agreement each period. This would lead us to considering incomplete
contracts where its stability and optimality is in jeopardy (see Pe´rez-Castrillo and
Sandonı´s, 1996). Also, a situation where firms can renegotiate at any point in
time the terms of the contract goes against the very spirit of a contract. From a
technical viewpoint, assuming α(t) and β(t) generates another type of dynamic
process different from the one of the quadratic family we consider in Definition 1
whose full discussion deserves an independent study.
3 One-period agreements
Let us first study the (benchmark) case where agreements are signed in a static
context. We find that the set of solutions is the union of two disjoint sets. From an
economic viewpoint, we are assessing (see Proposition 1) successful agreements
that take place either with firms with very similar or very different technological
endowments. It may be the case of two competitors with very similar technological
production systems, but may also be two very different competitors. An example
of the latter would be the case of a firm operating in a developed country that signs
an agreement with another firm in a developing country.
3.1 Separate markets
Let us normalize a = 1 in (8). Also, assume c = 0 in (1). This means that goods
are independent and firms are (local) monopolists in their respective markets. We
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1− µ¯
2
1 + µ¯
2
4− µ
4
0 λ0
1
2
1
1
Figure 1: Agreement under static local monopolies and µ > 4.
characterize the conditions under which those firms could profitably engage in an
agreement to develop a more efficient (cost saving) technology.
Definition 2. Consider two firms signing a pre-competitive agreement lasting for
one period (t = 1). According to (2), the cost function of each firm changes as
follows:
C1 = F (λ0)q1 = µλ0(1− λ0)q1,
C2 = F (λ0)ξq2 = µλ0(1− λ0)ξq2.
To decide whether to sign the agreement, these two firms simply compare prof-
its with and without agreement. The outcome of this comparison is described in
the proposition 1 and illustrated in Figure 1.
Proposition 1. Assume firms are local monopolies. They are willing to engage in
an agreement when:
λ0 ∈
[
0,
1
2
− µ
2
]
∪
[
1
2
+
µ
2
, 1
]
, if µ > 4,
∀λ0 ∈ [0, 1], if 0 < µ ≤ 4
where µ =
(µ−4
µ
) 1
2 ∈ (0, 1).
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Proof. We start by computing the corresponding equilibrium prices, quantities and
profits for both firms.
p˜m1 =
a1 + µλ0(1− λ0)b1
2b1
; q˜m1 =
a1 − µλ0(1− λ0)b1
2
,
Π˜m1 =
1
b1
(
a1 − µλ0(1− λ0)b1
2
)2
, (9)
p˜m2 =
a2 + µλ0(1− λ0)bξ
2b1
; q˜m2 =
a2 − µλ0(1− λ0)b2ξ
2
,
Π˜m2 =
1
b2
(
a2 − µλ0(1− λ0)b2ξ
2
)2
. (10)
Note that since λ0 ∈ (0, 1], the equilibrium prices are well defined. Also, note
that λ0(1 − λ0) < 1/4, so that when µ ∈ (0, 4] it follows that µλ0(1 − λ0) ≤ 1.
Accordingly, the equilibrium quantities take strictly positive values (recall that by
assumption ai > bi and ξ ∈ (0, 1]).
Next, when µ > 4, equilibrium quantities will be well defined if and only if
ai − µλ0(1 − λ0)bi > 0, or equivalently, iff µλ0(1 − λ0) < 1. The roots of this
inequality are
λ1,2 =
1
2
± µ
2
(11)
with µ =
(µ−4
µ
)1/2. Note that 0 < 1−µ2 < 1+µ2 < 1. Therefore, equilibrium
quantities when µ > 4 are well-defined for λ0 ∈
[
0, 12 − µ2
]
∪
[
1
2 +
µ
2 , 1
]
.
Finally, to assess the incentive to participate in an agreement we need to com-
pare profits. Given the symmetry of the equilibrium values, we can concentrate on
firm 1 and extend the conclusions to firm 2. Comparing profits firm 1 gets in (7)
and in (9), it is easy to see that firm 1 will participate in the agreement if and only
if,
1
b1
(
a1 − µλ0(1− λ0)b1
2
)2
>
1
b1
(
a1 − b1
2
)2
,
that reduces to a quadratic function of λ0,
b1[1− µλ0(1− λ0)] > 0. (12)
Given that b1 > 0 by assumption, we need to verify that [1−µλ0(1−λ0)] > 0.
As we have seen above, this inequality admits real roots only for µ > 4. These
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are given by (11). Therefore, inequality (12) is fulfilled for λ0 ∈
[
0, 12 − µ2
]
∪[
1
2 +
µ
2 , 1
]
.
When µ ∈ (0, 4], the quadratic function (12) does not have real roots and the
inequality [1− µλ0(1− λ0)] > 0 is satisfied for any value of λ0 ∈ [0, 1].
3.2 Interrelated markets
Assume that goods are substitutes (c > 0) so that we have an interrelated market
structure. The conditions under which firms may engage in a profitable agreement
will be characterized by the degree of substitutability (the value of c in the demand
system) and by the technical similarity between firms (the value of λ0). Again, we
normalize a = 1 in (8).
As before, firms will engage in an agreement if the agreement yields higher
profits than otherwise.
Proposition 2. Assume that goods are substitutes. Firms are willing to engage in
an agreement if goods are either poor substitutes or close substitutes. Let µ =(µ−4
µ
)1/2 ∈ (0, 1). Then,
• For µ > 4,
(i) for values of c small enough, the underlying technological initial condi-
tions supporting a sustainable agreement are λ0 ∈ [0, 1−µ2 ]∪ [1+µ2 , 1],
and
(ii) for values of c large enough the agreement is sustainable for λ0 ∈
(1−µ2 ,
1+µ
2 ).
• For 0 < µ ≤ 4, the agreement is sustainable only if c is small enough.
Proof. See Appendix
A symmetric argument will hold when goods are complements (c < 0), by
construction). Figure 2 illustrates.
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Figure 2: Agreement under static duopoly and µ > 4.
In the remainder of this study, we implicitly consider the case of substitute
goods. Concentrating the analysis to the case of independent firms has two pur-
poses. On the one hand it simplifies the technical development of the model pro-
viding useful intuitions for the case of interrelated markets. On the other hand,
looking at the partnerships that have formed along the years, we can identify a
good proportion where their participants develop their activities in different sectors
of the economy. In this sense, we think our analysis has value.7 Results are robust
to the substitute or complementary nature of final goods. The relevant feature is
the degree of competition among firms.
4 Multi-period agreements
We extend the results obtained in the previous section by introducing the time
dimension. In other words, we assume that when a firm takes a decision, it is
aware of the advantages of the agreement, following an iterating process given by
(8). We should note here that this diffusion process is well defined only for µ > 4.
We will maintain this assumption in the remaining of the analysis. With the logic
7Examples of these partnerships are agreements like Chamalon, Aider, or Chauffeur involving
partners form the rubber, automobile, aircraft, electronics, and telecom industries among others.
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developed in the single-period case, firms will now identify those combinations
of technologies (embedded in λ0), guaranteeing a profitable agreement lasting for
more than one period.
We will proceed in two steps. First, we will identify the conditions guarantee-
ing that subscribing to an agreement lasting for more than one period is profitable
for each firm. That is, we examine whether there are combinations of technologies,
embodied in the variable λ0, giving firms the incentive to maintain their collabo-
ration for t > 1 periods (Lemma 1). Narula and Hagedoorn (1999) note that firms
signing agreements look for profits in the short run. We transpose this evidence
in our setting by imposing the (strict) condition that we only admit agreements
that guarantee positive profits period by period (and not allowing for intertempo-
ral monetary transfers). In this first step, we concentrate on a situation in which
two local monopolies (i.e. duopoly in separate markets) may decide to extend the
length of an existing agreement and we evaluate the conditions under which such
a decision may be successful. The second step illustrates by means of an example
how the set of solutions depends on the time horizon.
Lemma 1. Consider two local monopolists and let µ > 4. For an existing (t− 1)-
period agreement, there is a range of values of λ0 allowing to extend the agreement
one additional period. It is given by λ0 ∈ (34 , 1].
Proof. Given the structure of the iterative function, we can write λ1 = µλ0(1 −
λ0), . . . , λt = µλt−1(1− λt−1), λt+1 = µλt(1− λt).
As a consequence, the sequence of profits for, say, firm 1 in every iteration t is,
Π˜m1t =
1
b1
(
a1 − λtb1
2
)2
, t = 1, 2, . . . (13)
Our local monopolist will be willing to extend the agreement from period t− 1 to
period t if and only if,
Π˜m1t > Π˜
m
1t−1. (14)
Note that, from the expressions of profits, it follows that sign[Π˜m1t − Π˜m1t−1] =
sign[λt−1 − λt]. Accordingly, inequality (14) reduces to studying the values of λ
satisfying λt−1 − λt > 0.
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Given that λt = µλt−1(1 − λt−1), the previous expression holds for λt−1 >
1 − 1µ . Given that µ > 4, firms will be willing to extend the agreement from
period t− 1 to t if λt−1 > 34 .
Lemma 1 gives the consistency conditions ensuring that given an agreement
of length t, there are no incentives to break it at an earlier period. These condi-
tions involve firms’ technologies being sufficiently similar. Note that equation (8),
describing the diffusion of the technological change, considers λ0 as the initial
(exogenous) condition. This is the description before the agreement of the techno-
logical differences between firms. Thus, the Lemma proves that, given some initial
conditions, firms will maintain their collaboration period after period as long as the
diffusion process maintains their technologies similar enough. Also, note that the
degree of feasible similarity is increasing over time, even though the less efficient
firm never catches up with its partner. Moreover, according to the expected length
of the agreement, the magnitude of benefits over production costs varies.8
We illustrate the dynamics of a local monopolist forecasting the impact on
profits period by period when planning to sign an agreement lasting for t periods.9
4.1 The two-period agreement
Consider an agreement lasting for two periods. Firm 1 evaluates the profits that it
will receive at the end of period two, according to the technology available at that
time.10 They are given by Π˜m12 =
1
b1
(
a1−λ2b1
2
)2
. Then, it compares these profits
with the ones in absence of agreement given by (7). It turns out that Π˜m12 > Π
m
1 if
8We do not explicitly model punishments for deviations from the agreements. This would go be-
yond the main of the analysis. Remember that we are assuming that the model satisfies the condition
for an optimal contract to exist. Accordingly, the design of the contract already takes into account
those penalties.
9In general, this is the kind of cost-benefit analysis that firms carry out when they evaluate the
convenience of joining an agreement. Firms look at the evolution of profits over a finite horizon
from the actual situation by computing the present (discounted) value of the flow of future profits.
In addition, we compare stock variables at different moments in time and implicitly discount them
at the same rate. It is important to remember that we are considering extreme cases where the agree-
ment must be profitable during every single period. Midler assumptions would consider comparing
aggregate discounted profits over a certain number of periods. Then opportunities for successful
collaboration should appear more easily.
10Remember that firms can exploit the benefits they get from the agreement only at the end of
period two.
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Figure 3: Feasible agreements at t = 2
b1(1− λ2) > 0, that is,
b1[1− µ2λ0(1− λ0)][1− µλ0(1− λ0)] = b1[1− F 2(λ0)] > 0. (15)
This is a polynomial of degree four, with real roots only for µ > 4. As displayed
in Figure 3, for µ > 4, inequality (15) admits four strictly positive critical points
(0 < λ21 < λ22 < λ23 < λ24 < 1), where
λ2i =
1
2
±
√
µ2 − 2µ(1± µ)
2µ
, µ =
(µ− 4
µ
)1/2 ∈ (0, 1), for µ > 4
and i = 1, 2, 3, 4 according to the combination of positive or negative signs of the
square roots chosen. Therefore, (15) is satisfied for
λ0 ∈ [0, λ21] ∪ [λ22, λ23] ∪ [λ24, 1] .
Finally, combining the range of admissible values of λ0 just obtained for pe-
riod 2 with the corresponding ones in period 1 (see Proposition 1), we get the range
of values of λ0 for which the two-period agreement is profitable:
λ0 ∈ [0, λ21] ∪
[
λ22,
1
2
− µ
2
]
∪
[
1
2
+
µ
2
, λ23
]
∪ [λ24, 1] .
Figure 4 illustrates.
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Figure 4: Two-period profitable agreements
4.2 The N-period agreement
As shown by this example and illustrated in Figure 4, the different intervals of
solutions shrink when the number of iterations increases, i.e., the length of the
agreement expands.
Hence, the general question is to determine the values of λ0 for which an agree-
ment can be successful based on its length, knowing that the set of admissible
values of λ0 shrinks when the time dimension increases.
The set of values of λ0 we are interested in is defined as the intersection of
the sets of values of λ0 supporting agreements lasting for one period (given by
equation (12)), lasting for two periods (given by equation (15)), lasting for three
periods, etc. Let us rewrite those conditions in the following way:
• For agreements lasting one period (t = 1), the possible values of joint
efficiency to reduce production costs entailing a successful agreement are
λ0 ∈ Λ1 ⊂ (0, 1) such that G(λ0) ≡ 1− F (λ0) ≥ 0,
• For agreements lasting two periods (t = 2), the possible values of joint
efficiency to reduce production costs entailing a successful agreement are
λ0 ∈ Λ2 ⊂ Λ1 such that G2(λ0) ≡ 1− F 2(λ0) ≥ 0.
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.....
• For agreements lasting N periods (t = N), the possible values of joint
efficiency to reduce production costs entailing a successful agreement are
λ0 ∈ ΛN ⊂ ΛN−1 such that GN (λ0) ≡ 1− FN (λ0) ≥ 0.
Such behavior is induced by the iterative structure of function FN (λ0). At the
limit, when t→∞ we obtain a infinite collection of points as the set of solutions.
These points are precisely the (infinite) roots of a polynomial (of infinite degree),
resulting from the comparison of profits between signing an infinite horizon agree-
ment and no agreement at all. To clarify this argument, define At as the set of
λ0-points that escape from the interval I = (0, 1) at iteration t + 1. That is, those
points that were admissible at iteration t but are no longer solutions after iteration
t+ 1. Formally,
At = {λ0 ∈ I |Gt(λ0) < 0 and Gτ (λ0) ∈ I, τ < t}.
This set of the solutions (Λ), after an infinite number of iterations, reduces to:
Λ = I \ ∞∪
t=0
At.
Proposition 3. Λ is a Cantor set.
Proof. See Appendix.
We provide here an informal argument of the proof of proposition 3. Remem-
ber that a Cantor set is defined as closed, perfect and totally disconnected.
Intuitively, note that At are open sets. Thus, Λ is formed by (sequentially)
suppressing from the interval I a collection of open sets that are disjoint intervals.
In other words, Λ is the union of closed and disjoint intervals, and thus closed.
Incidentally, note that Λ is not empty because at least it contains the extreme points
of the suppressed intervals.
Next, by definition, a set is perfect if it does not contain isolated points; in other
words, all of its points are limit points. Let us assume on the contrary, that x ∈ Λ
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is an isolated point. Then x must be an extreme point common to two adjacent
intervals. As we have previously argued, Λ is a collection of disjoint intervals.
Hence, those adjacent intervals do not have points in common. Accordingly, x
cannot be an isolated point.
Finally, a set is totally disconnected if it does not contain any open intervals.
Again, let us proceed by contradiction. Assume that there exists an open interval
δ ∈ Λ. Then δ has to be contained in one of the open intervals obtained in an
iteration τ . However, this is not possible since as τ →∞, the length of the intervals
tends to zero. Thus, at the limit Λ has an infinite number of points.
Indeed, our main conclusion can be described in terms of the probability of the
existence of a suitable technology matching between the two firms. Such probabil-
ity decreases with the length of the contract. In other words, a firm willing to sign
a short-term agreement will find it quite likely that the other firm has a technology
suitable for a matching. As the commitment term that a firm is willing to engage in
increases, it becomes less and less likely that the technology of the other firm will
be suitable to sign an agreement. Therefore, our model provides a rationalization
of the prevalence of short-run agreements as described by the empirical evidence.
Our diffusion process is set on the discrete logistic map. In this sense, we can
obtain the same qualitative results with other functions F of the quadratic family
(Devaney, 1985). Recently, Blackmore et. al (2009) have proved that a discrete
system similar to the model of the Set-Reset Flip-Flop circuit can also be used
with the same purpose. Its expression looks as follows
F t(λ0) = λt = λ[ν(1− λt−1) + y]; λ = 4.1
and, when y is small the system acts like the discrete logistic map.
5 Discussion and conclusions
This paper proposes an iterative dynamic process among firms to introduce a time
dimension for partnership in pre-competitive agreements. Every expansion of the
time horizon in one period eliminates an open set of λ0-values that were solutions
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in the previous time horizon. The extreme points of those intervals remain in the
set of solutions Λ though. A value of λ0 that has been eliminated as a solution after
an enlargement of the time horizon, remains out of Λ forever; in other words, it
cannot be considered again as a solution as the length of the agreement increases.
From an intuitive viewpoint, the successful combination of the technological
endowments are basically of two types: with very similar or very dissimilar tech-
nologies. On the one side, the successfulness of agreements with technological
similar firms may be supported by the peer status that both the firms may have
in the signed agreement, and, as a consequence, by the natural affinities that may
arise between them yielding an efficient matching. On the other side, the case of
very dissimilar technologies between firms may be associated with the classical
leader-follower partner structure. In this case, the successfulness may be due to
the right degree of complementarity between the two partners. By contrast, the
intermediate values of λ0 leading to unfruitful agreements can be considered as in-
between situations in which the role of the partners cannot be defined so precisely.
These are situations in which contracts are less likely to be profitable because, for
instance, some competition effects may be stronger than in the other two situations
and, possibly, free rider behaviors may occur more frequently.
Given this dynamic process, as firms envision longer agreements, an increasing
number of smaller intervals are excluded as solutions.
Proposition 3 tells us that knowing the length of the agreement, a firm evaluates
the advantages prior to signing the agreement. According to initial conditions (λ0),
it may or may not be able to fulfill its expectations. Moreover, the iteration process
imposes that firms need to be very careful when choosing the agreement (a partner
and a time horizon), given their initial technologies. In other words, if a firm
wants to derive the expected benefits from an agreement, it needs to be extremely
precise in choosing the right partner allowing to fulfill its expectations. With an
infinite number of iterations, there is a number of discrete points λ0 ensuring the
success of the agreement. These correspond to the optimal combinations of initial
technologies available at the firm level. However, the probability of such matching
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to occur is zero.
In order to obtain the intuition contained in this result, imagine a firm that is
willing to sign a short-term agreement. It can find a compatible partner almost
effortlessly. As the commitment the firm is willing to engage in increases, the dif-
ficulty of finding a suitable partner also increases. The reason behind this difficulty
is not that there are fewer partners available (there are always an infinite number),
but rather that getting to identify suitable firms becomes increasingly hard.
Casual empiricism points out that most research projects have a short time
horizon (maximum of 5 years). Accordingly, we should expect to observe research
projects involving firms with relatively different initial technologies or relatively
similar initial technologies. Examples of projects showing these characteristics are
the EU-sponsored Carsense and Cartalk projects.11 Our analysis provides some
rationale to these empirical observations.
The relevant feature that we want to stress of our approach is that we are able
to propose a novel argument to explain the increasing difficulty in observing long-
lasting pre-competitive agreements.
The partnership agreements are mainly perceived as a cost-sharing device (see
Nicolini and Artige, 2008). Of course, the major problem faced by firms is the
choice of an appropriate partner to avoid the waste of capital in case of failure.
Thus, it appears that public policies should target some cost-sharing mechanisms
through partnership agreements satisfying two conditions: (i) the most suitable
(and effective) policy should target short-term agreements and, (ii) the partnership
between two competitors is a feasible contract that yields positive benefits to the
two parts upon completing the terms of the contract.
Some extensions deserve attention. We have only considered firms operating
in separate markets. Section 3 studying agreements that do not span in time, leads
11Carsense is a consortium of 12 European car manufacturers, suppliers and research institutes,
sponsored by the EC to develop a sensor system, that shall give sufficient information on the car
environment at low speeds in order to allow low speed driving. See http://www.carsense.org. Cartalk
is another consortium of 7 European car manufacturers, suppliers and research institutes, sponsored
by the EC and focusing on new driver assistance systems based on inter-vehicle communication. See
http://www.cartalk2000.net.
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us to conclude that qualitatively, the outcomes of the local monopolies case and the
interrelated market case are similar. The introduction of time in Section 4 involves
a dynamic process but it does not change the dynamics of the decision process of
firms when markets are separated. Hence, we conjecture that the remaining case of
multi-period agreements between firms in interrelated markets will also be charac-
terized by a Cantor set-type of solutions as the number of iterations increases, but
the results are more blurred. Other extensions deal with uncertainty and technical
development in a full dynamic learning process (giving structure to λ0), or allowing
for the possibility that a firm can leave the agreement before its completion.
Finally, from an enlarged perspective, our analysis can be extended to problems
where the matching condition between two partners is fundamental such as the la-
bor market, or other decisions in a social behavioral context. As in our framework,
in these situations the essential feature is the alignment of objectives between the
two parties involved.
Appendix 1: Proof of proposition 2
Here, firms compete a` la Bertrand in the market. The equilibrium prices, quantities,
and profits are,
p1 =
2b2a1 + ca2
4b1b2 − c2 ; q1 = b1p1; Π1 = b1
(
2b2a1 + ca2
4b1b2 − c2
)2
, (16)
p2 =
2b1a2 + ca1
4b1b2 − c2 ; q2 = b2p2; Π2 = b2
(
2b1a2 + ca1
4b1b2 − c2
)2
, (17)
where a1 = a1 − µλ0(1− λ0)[b1 − cξ] and a2 = a2 − µλ0(1− λ0)[b2ξ − c].
As before, given the symmetry of the problem, we concentrate on the behavior
of firm 1. Firm 1 evaluates the benefits it can get from the agreement and compares
the level of profits with and without the agreement. That is, it compares profits in
(6) and (16). Participating in an agreement will be profitable if and only if,
b1
(
2b2a1 + ca2
4b1b2 − c2
)2
> b1
(
2b2aˆ1 + caˆ2
4b1b2 − c2
)2
.
After some algebraic computations, the previous inequality reduces to,
b1[1− µλ0(1− λ0)](2b1b2 − b2cξ − c2) > 0. (18)
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Note that (18) differs from (12) in the second term in (round) brackets. Note
also that this term is independent of λ0. The second term in round brackets is
concave in c, and has one positive and one negative root. Therefore, for positive
values of c smaller than the positive root, the term (2b1b2 − b2cξ − c2) is positive,
and inequality (18) behaves as (12). Thus, we obtain the same result as in the
monopoly case. In contrast, for large enough values of c (beyond the positive root),
the term (2b1b2 − b2cξ − c2) is negative, so that the inequality is fulfilled when
[1−µλ0(1−λ0)] < 0 that is, for λ0 ∈ (1−µ2 , 1+µ2 ), where µ =
(µ−4
µ
)1/2 ∈ (0, 1),
for µ > 4.
When 0 < µ ≤ 4 the first term of (18) in square brackets is always positive.
Hence, a solution exists only if the second term in round brackets is positive, i.e.
for positive values of c smaller than the positive root.
Appendix 2: Proof of proposition 3
We need to prove that Λ is a Cantor set, namely, that it is a closed, perfect and
totally disconnected subset of I . Following Devaney (1985), we structure the proof
in three steps.
1. Λ is a closed set.
Let us defineG(λ0) = 1−F (λ0) and re-write it asG ≡ 1−F . By construction
Ai is an open interval centered around 1/2 (see Figure 4). Let us concentrate on
A0. In that case, the function G maps both the intervals I0 = [0, λ1] and I1 =
[λ2, 1] monotonically onto I . Moreover, G is decreasing on the first interval and
increasing on the second. Since G(I0) = G(I1) = I there is a pair of intervals
(one in I0 and the other in I1) which are mapped onto A0 by G. These intervals
define the set A1. Next, let us consider Λ1 = I − (A0 ∪ A1). This set consists of
four closed intervals (see Figure 4) and G maps them monotonically onto either I0
or I1, but as before, each of the four intervals contains an open subinterval which
is mapped by G2 onto A0, i.e., the points of this interval escape from I after the
third iteration of G. By applying this iterative process, we note that At consists of
2t disjoint open intervals and Λt = I − (A0 ∪ · · · ∪ At) consists of 2t+1 closed
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intervals. Hence, Λ is a nested intersection of closed intervals, and is thus a closed
set.
2. Λ is a perfect set.
Note that all endpoints of At, (t = 1, . . . ) are contained in Λ. Such points are
eventually mapped to the fixed point of G at 1, and they stay in I under iteration.
If a point x ∈ Λ, were isolated, each nearby point must leave I under iteration,
and therefore these points must belong to some At. Two possibilities arise. We can
think of a sequence of endpoints ofAt converging to x. In this case the endpoints of
At map to 1 and so, they are in Λ. Alternatively, all points in a deleted area nearby
x are mapped out of I by some iteration of G. In this case, we may assume thatGτ
maps x to 1 and all the other nearby points are mapped in the positive axis above 1.
Then Gτ has a minimum at x, i.e., G′τ (x) = 0. This iterative process ensures that
it must be so for some t < τ . Hence, Gt(x) = 1/2, but then Gt+1(x) /∈ I and
Gτ (x)→ −∞, contradicting the fact that Gτ (x) = 1.
3. Λ is a totally disconnected set.
Let us focus in the first iteration and assume µ is large enough so that |G′(x)| >
1 for all x ∈ I0∪I1. For those values of µ, there exists γ > 1 such that |G′(x)| > γ
for all x ∈ Λ. Our iterative process yields |G′τ (x)| > γτ . We want to prove
that Λ does not contain any interval. Let us proceed by contradiction and assume
that there is a closed interval [x, y] ∈ Λ, x, y ∈ I0 ∪ I1, x 6= y. In this case,
|G′τ (z)| > γτ , for all z ∈ [x, y]. Choose τ so that λτ |y − x| > 1. Applying the
Mean Value Theorem, it follows that |Gτ (y) − Gτ (x)| ≥ γτ |y − x| > 1, imply-
ing that either Gτ (y) or Gτ (x) lies outside of I . This contradicts with our main
hypothesis, and thus Λ does not contain intervals. It remains to be determined the
µ-values for which the previous argument holds. Finding the values of µ allowing
|G′(x)| > 1 means to identify µ-values for which [−µ (1− 2x)]2 > 1. When
G = 0, this inequality holds for µ > 2 +
√
5. Thus, we have proven that Λ is
totally disconnected for µ > 2 +
√
5. Recall from Lemma 1 that we already know
that µ > 4. Hence, we need to verify whether Λ is also totally disconnected for
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µ ∈ (4, 2 +√5]. We appeal to Kraft (1999) who establishes that Λ is a Cantor set
for µ > 4. The idea behind the proof is that for µ ∈ (4, 2 + √5] it turns out that
|G′(x)| S 1. Kraft argues that the iteration process shrinks some components of I ,
and stretches some others. His proof thus consists in showing that in the interval
(4, 2+
√
5) the stretching is dominated by the shrinking. To this end, he proves that
Λ is an hyperbolic set, namely that |G′τ (x)| > kδτ > 1 for x ∈ Λ, k > 0, δ > 1.
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